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Diagnosing Beijing 2020:
Mapping the Ungovernable City
Robin Visser
Urban theory regularly formulates and individuates 
the city as inherently ungovernable.  By this I mean 
that the city is a space comprised of social actors 
that elude the embrace of government. ‘The city is 
thus both a problem for government and a perma-
nent incitement to government’, write Engin Isin, 
Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose in their insight-
ful paper, ‘Governing Cities’.1 For them the notion of 
the diagram is particularly illuminating as something 
not merely ideological or ideal, but as something 
that is functional yet somehow intrinsic to its effects. 
Examining these effects in urban mapping can 
guide our diagnosis of the city through attention to 
‘the particular lines of force each diagram imagines 
between the virtuous and vicious powers imma-
nent to the city’.2 Such lines of force cannot be read 
directly, but must be diagnosed from histories, symp-
toms and surfaces. More often than not the maps 
generated by urban planners fail to explicitly identify 
these competing force-fields; labels instead evoke 
the prevalent metaphors for governance ideals. 
From the garden city of the late nineteenth century, 
to the streets-in-the-sky proposed by modernism 
to today’s new urban villages, each presupposes 
a particular form of civil disorder: those elements 
hidden from surveillance must be made transpar-
ent; the illegibility inciting confusion and chaos 
must be ordered; the alienation of individualism and 
privatisation must be stemmed by invoking earlier 
social aspirations.  
 If one traces the genesis of urban theory and 
its diagrams from conceptions of the Greek polis, 
as do Isin et al, ‘it might be said that the specifi-
city of the nineteenth-century problematisation of 
the city occurs at the point at which the city ceases 
to be a model for good government and becomes 
concretised as a milieu of government’.3 As we 
turn to Beijing, however, in an attempt to diagnose 
a city through its imagined future, we should first 
understand that the two terms have always been 
co-terminous in Beijing’s conceptualisation. For this 
reason urban theory ideals derived from the knowl-
edge structures of the European Enlightenment 
and Western modernisms find resonance in China 
today, particularly in the wake of the resurgence of 
scientific rationality during the Reform Era (1978-
1989). Chinese planning, which John Friedmann 
has characterised as ‘orthogonal’ or ‘Euclidean’, 
generally presents itself as value neutral and engi-
neering-based, incapable of addressing the ‘wicked 
problems’ inherent in market-based development.4 
In recent years a confluence of pressures infusing 
the Chinese city has led Chinese planners to adopt 
the postmodern discourse of sustainability, however 
these strategic aims are largely superimposed upon 
earlier modernist statist practices.
 Not only do modernist epistemologies remain 
largely unexamined amongst Chinese urban 
theorists and practitioners to date5, but ‘good 
governance’ is animated by alternate valences. The 
ideal did not mean, in the Athenian sense, debates 
conducted within the agora, but rather, in the 
Confucian signification, the paternalistic patterning 
of empire – spatially embodied in the ordering of 
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the imperial city – after familial hierarchies. Many 
of the historic patterns in the spatial administration 
and design of Chinese cities – uniformity, regularity, 
hierarchy, cellularity, and ritual symbolism of urban 
space – continue to support governmental control 
of society: ‘Chinese cities are bound into a regional 
and national system of governance that extends 
below the municipal level down to that of the street 
and household’.6 Beijing, now characterised by the 
‘off-ground’ architecture distinguishing neo-liberal 
privatisation, is attempting to mitigate the damaging 
effects of rampant development on the social fabric, 
cultural heritage and the environment by practicing 
sustainable urban planning. Yet we may wonder, as 
in the more general case of the city diagram, whether 
these new mappings of Beijing function primarily as 
strategic rhetorical metaphors that mask unnamed, 
imminent threats to governance.
 Before examining Beijing through its future 
mappings, it is instructive to consider how urban 
historians assess the current relationship of the 
capital to its historic diagrams. In Beijing: The 
Nature and Planning of a Chinese Capital City, 
Victor F.S. Sit examines its three thousand year 
history, including eight hundred years as China’s 
capital and cultural and political centre of the Liao, 
Jin, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties. At its very 
inception Beijing was laid out according to the rules 
for a ‘ruler city’ (wang cheng) as prescribed in the 
Zhouli Kaogongji, a planning and construction text 
based on Confucian principles. Maps of Dadu, the 
‘Great Capital’ of the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368), 
reveal a close adherence to the Zhouli prescrip-
tion of a ‘nine-li square, three gates on the sides, 
divided by a grid of nine paths horizontally and later-
ally with Imperial Ancestral Temple to the east and 
Alters of Soil and Grain to the west, an outer court 
to the south and marketplaces to the north’.7 In such 
a plan the ideal of lizhi – the use of ritual action to 
rule a country – established the sanctity of imperial 
rule, with the north-south axis design represent-
ing the authority of the state. In this sense, Beijing 
contained key elements of what Victor Sit terms ‘the 
ideal Chinese City as reflecting the traditional world 
view of Confucianism’ in its:
 
1. site (a central location relative to subjects and 
natural environs)
2. orientation (facing south, the direction of 
potency)
3. layout (square and orderly, conforming with the 
orderliness of nature)
4. central location of palace or administration 
(symbolising centralisation of power and the 
mandate from Heaven to rule)
5. ceremonial building of the Ancestral Hall and 
Altar of Grains and Soils (reflecting the lineage of 
the sovereign to the sage kings)
6. the wall (symbolising the sovereign’s reign on 
earth)
7. location of the market to the north (represent-
ing the lesser significance of trade and merchant 
classes in an agrarian economy).8
 The traditional Chinese urban form, concludes 
Sit, was a utilitarian setting in which society func-
tioned while also providing a symbolic function for 
the state to inform and guide human behaviour. In 
this sense, he argues, Beijing’s traditional role as 
the national centre of communication and control is 
mirrored in its recent development as a global city 
at the centre of finance and corporate decisions, 
providing communication and financial controls 
over material production and consumption rather 
than engaging in productive activities.9  
 Other urban theorists writing in the late twenti-
eth century locate Beijing’s historical continuity in 
the symbolism of Tiananmen Square. In ‘Beijing: 
The Expression of a National Political Ideology’, 
Zhu Zixuan and Reginald Yin-Wang Kwok sanction 
contemporary Beijing urban planning, particularly in 
relation to the city centre:
Positioned at the centre of Beijing’s traditional north-
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south axis and the new east-west axis, Tiananmen 
Square is the heart of the capital. Surrounded by 
carefully selected and designed structures, the 
square has taken on immense political and ideo-
logical meaning, symbolizing not only the authority 
but the historical continuity of the state, with the 
imperial dynasty replaced by the socialist republic. 
As Beijing moves toward the twenty-first century, 
Tiananmen Square is truly at the nation’s centre, in 
both symbolic and utilitarian terms.10 [fig. 1]
 Tsinghua University architectural historian Wu 
Huanjia goes even further, expansively endorsing 
Beijing’s development by celebrating its historical 
continuity in creating urban forms that signal regime 
change. The Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) emperors, 
on the other hand, come in for criticism for abdicat-
ing their stewardship of Beijing as rulers by leaving 
it largely unchanged.11 ‘According to [Wu Huanjia’s] 
logic’, writes Daniel Abramson in his critique of 
Anne-Marie Broudehoux’s The Making and Selling 
of Post-Mao Beijing, ‘it is precisely the current 
destruction and remaking of Beijing that affirms 
most strongly its permanence as the seat of China’s 
national government’.12
 In order to affirm its legitimacy, the Communist 
Party transformed Beijing into a beacon of social-
ism via symbolism associated, in particular, with 
the sacred space of Tiananmen Square. Art histo-
rian Wu Hung opens Remaking Beijing: Tiananmen 
Square and the Creation of a Political Space by 
implying that the choices of this regime signalled 
the city’s utter decimation: ‘As soon as Beijing 
was made the capital of the People’s Republic of 
China this ancient city reached a fatal moment in its 
survival’.13 Wu Hung’s analysis begs the question of 
what immanence of the city will fail to survive, and 
invites comparison with the opening line of a book 
that locates the urban in the intangible. Italo Calvino 
begins Invisible Cities with ‘Kublai Khan does not 
necessarily believe everything Marco Polo says 
when he describes the cities visited on his expe-
ditions, but … only in Marco Polo’s accounts was 
Kublai Khan able to discern, through the walls and 
towers destined to crumble, the tracery of a pattern 
so subtle it could escape the termites’ gnawing’. 
The Khan discerned this timeless pattern even in 
that ‘desperate moment when we discover that 
this empire, which had seemed to us the sum of all 
wonders, is an endless, formless ruin, that corrup-
tion’s gangrene has spread too far to be healed by 
our sceptre, that the triumph over enemy sover-
eigns has made us the heirs of their long undoing’.14 
These fictional metaphysical musings between 
the emperor and his envoy become weighty when 
considering the present fate of the ancient capital 
of Beijing, one of the Khan’s domains when it was 
named Dadu and proclaimed capital of the Yuan 
Dynasty in 1271. Whether something inherent to the 
city will survive radical alterations to its governing 
polity and urban fabric remains an open question. 
The imminent sociability that is the city may govern 
it after all.
 Many know the details and aftermath of the 
Party’s decision not to adopt Liang Sicheng’s and 
Chen Zhanxiang’s 1950’s plan to locate the admin-
istrative centre to the west of the Old City. The 
story of how Liang wept at the destruction of the 
ancient city walls in 1952 (eventually replaced by 
the Second Ringroad) has entered the realm of 
urban lore. But fifty years later, when journalist and 
urban historian Wang Jun revisited the debate in 
his best-selling book Chengji (City Records, its title 
also translated as An Evolutionary History of Beijing 
City), Mao Zedong’s missed opportunity particu-
larly resonated with Chinese citizens suffering from 
pollution, congestion, and needless loss of cultural 
heritage.15 Wu Hung insists that the consequences 
of Mao’s decision cannot be exaggerated: ‘all the 
subsequent destruction and construction of Beijing 
were fundamentally determined at this moment …. 
In short, Beijing’s fate was sealed by locating the 
government in the old city’.16 The ‘concentric circles 
with one centre’ pattern of development has resulted 
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Fig. 1: The Forbidden City and Tiananmen Square remain the ideological and physical center of the municipality today.  
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in endless downtown traffic jams in an area compris-
ing twelve per cent of the city but carrying a fourth of 
the total traffic flow to the four hundred government 
organs and institutions crowded within it. Mean-
while, the incessant ‘ringing’ of Beijing continues, 
with a Sixth Ringroad (20 km from the city centre) 
completed in 2005 and a Seventh Ringroad extend-
ing beyond the city limits in the works.
 By the twenty-first century outrage at the oppor-
tunistic redevelopment of Beijing and other Chinese 
cities was ubiquitous.17  A 2004 report published 
by China Development Press lambasted China’s 
grossly underdeveloped urban planning theory, 
skills, law and practice, and went so far as to quote 
Tianjin writer Feng Jicai’s fierce deprecation of offi-
cials for destroying the nation’s cultural heritage:
Whether superficially pursuing instant modernization, 
frenetically accumulating political accomplishments, 
or purely fixated on economic gain, city administra-
tors have wantonly handed over piece after piece of 
urban real estate to developers. The vast majority 
of these officials have absolutely no knowledge of 
the cultural heritage of these cities, and no desire 
to learn about it. So in a mere decade the unique 
features, historical ethos, and cultural attractions 
of many cities have been utterly destroyed. The 
cultural losses are enormous! How many cities 
in the world preserve their ancient features as a 
source of pride? We, on the other hand, show off the 
appalling ‘marvel’ of ‘changing the map every three 
months’! It is no exaggeration to state that every 
single minute a significant portion of our historical 
cultural heritage is destroyed by an excavator. Yet 
the distinctiveness of each city is only formed after 
hundreds and thousands of years of accumulated 
human creativity.18
 Civic activism among artists, intellectuals, journal-
ists, and other citizens in Beijing gained an audience, 
and in May of 2006 the Chinese Minister of Culture, 
Sun Jiazheng, became the first high-level minister to 
publicly apologise for the government’s destruction 
of traditional Beijing as part of its relentless push to 
modernise. He confessed that the government had 
broken its own rules in allowing redevelopment of 
the country’s cultural heritage, saying ‘some cities 
have unilaterally gone all out to get a new look and 
have not done enough to protect old buildings … 
There are things that I should have done and did 
not do, meetings I should have attended and did 
not attend’.19 Urban China editor Jiang Jun credits 
civic activism and consciousness-raising efforts 
such as City Records, for its impact on the attitudes 
of government officials: ‘many officials confessed to 
Wang Jun that they were highly ashamed of their 
neglect of preservation’.20  
 The ‘model for good government’ ideal looms 
large as municipal officials are subject to intensifying 
public scrutiny. Deep cultural values around ‘face’ 
and the responsibility of upright officials to the people 
have coalesced into plans to curb further destruc-
tion of the ‘milieu of government’. The history and 
symptoms engendering the Beijing 2020 diagrams 
suggest that the political expediency of ‘sustain-
ability’ places it into direct conflict with its alleged 
goals. As the formation of civil society becomes a 
real possibility in urban China, officials increasingly 
insist upon maintaining the spatial centrality of the 
seat of government vis-à-vis its municipal environs, 
symbolising the centralisation of power and the 
mandate from Heaven to rule. Sustainable develop-
ment is further undermined by the general hostility of 
neo-liberal development strategies to metropolitan 
and regional level planning place. The 2020 Plans 
for Beijing Municipality, transparently displayed (in 
part) in the Beijing Planning Exhibition Hall, speak 
less to a moral rectification of the planning process 
than to the immanence of destabilising factors.
Sustainable Beijing 2020
Since the opening of the Beijing Planning Exhibition 
Hall in 2004, Beijing Municipality has showcased the 
key features of its 2020 master plan to the general 
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public, a major policy shift from previous plans which 
were shrouded in secrecy. [fig. 2] The 2020 master 
plan prominently adopts the ‘sustainable city’ ideal 
which permeates global urban planning and prac-
tice. Planning, in general, and the natural/scientific 
basis of the sustainable urban development ideal, in 
particular, may be socially legitimised on the basis 
of expert knowledge and rational explanation, but it 
makes permanent recourse to abstract metaphors. 
Peter Brand explains the effectiveness of meta-
phors in planning: ‘in contrast to rational analysis 
… metaphors are not analytical in the sense of 
disaggregating problems and uncovering causal 
relations; rather, they condense meaning and 
symbolize aspirations’.21 The steady abstraction of 
the idea of sustainability since the 1987 Brundtland 
Commission Report supports the idea that ‘sustain-
ability’ evokes rather than denotes. Whereas the 
earliest uses of the term referred to the objective 
condition of natural resources systems, sustainable 
urban development became increasingly associ-
ated with a social subjectivity concerning the quality 
of life, interdependency, welfare, inclusion and 
cohesion. An expanded definition of the term, which 
synthesises its connotations by 2000, reads ‘devel-
opment that does not require resources beyond 
its environmental capacity, is equitable, promotes 
social justice, and is created through inclusive deci-
sion-making procedures’.22 As such, argues Brand, 
the sustainable city becomes ‘a virtual metaphor 
for reanimating earlier social aspirations’ in the 
new context of postmodern individuality and priva-
tisation, while also ‘insistently profiling the future in 
counterpoint to the mesmerising uncertainties of an 
ever-changing present’.23
 In post-revolutionary China, pressure from dysto-
pian sentiments over the rising Gini coefficient and 
the loss of socialist egalitarianism yielded proposals 
for a ‘New Socialist Countryside’ in 2005, equitable 
labour laws in 2006, and rural health care initiatives 
legislated during the 17th Party Congress in 2007. In 
a country where the urban-rural dichotomy remains 
systematically intact, despite its radical urbanisation 
from 18% in 1978 to 43% in 2005,24 the metaphors 
animating rural and urban development connote 
differently. Programs such as the ‘New Socialist 
Countryside’, which are clearly ‘virtual metaphors 
for earlier social aspirations’ under Maoism, mark 
urgent attempts by the government to sustain the 
present (i.e., maintain social stability) rather than to 
‘profile the future’. The metaphors used for urban 
development, on the other hand, serve to pacify fears 
among urban elite about contamination, overcrowd-
ing and environmental degradation by ‘insistently 
profiling the future in counterpoint’. Diagrams such 
as the 2020 Plans for Beijing Municipality are rich 
sources for diagnosing the planning rhetoric of 
‘sustaining the environment’ and ‘reclaiming social 
justice’, timely figures for rational governance of the 
immanent ecological destruction and social chaos 
wrought by radical and uneven urban develop-
ment.  
 Shi Xiaodong, a planner with the Beijing Munici-
pal Institute of City Planning and Design, recently 
introduced four of these plans to an academic audi-
ence in the United States as follows:
Beijing’s fast growth during the last two decades 
has been accompanied by a broad set of issues 
such as sprawling and congested metropolitan 
areas, limited space resources, degrading environ-
ments, and skyrocketing housing prices. In facing 
these issues, decision-makers began to realize 
that pursuing economic growth in a single dimen-
sion would not be sustainable. Recent efforts have 
manifested Beijing’s determination in developing the 
city in a more sustainable way. The most important 
recent planning efforts carried out by city planners 
include: 
Beijing 2006-2015 ‘Rail Transit Plan’ for Compact 
City
Beijing 2005-2020 ‘Underground Space Plan’ for 
Alternative Space
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Beijing 2006-2020 ‘Undevelopable Area Plan’ for 
Ecological Responsibility 
Beijing 2006-2010 ‘Low-income Housing Plan’ for 
Affordability and Livability.25
 Entitled ‘Scientific Growth for Chinese Cities: 
Experiences from Beijing’, Shi Xiaodong’s presen-
tation detailed plans to actualise the metaphors of 
sustainable development by creating a ‘compact 
city’ with ‘alternative space’ which is ‘ecologi-
cally responsible’ and ‘livable’. These metaphors, 
adopted in a literal sense, enliven plans to reduce 
objectively defined problems of overcrowding, envi-
ronmental degradation, and social inequity. Each 
of these plans materialised from dozens of munici-
pality mappings synthesising extensive scientific 
analysis.  
 The Beijing 2006-2020 ‘Restricted Development 
Area Plan’ for Ecological Responsibility, for example, 
incorporates boundary maps, topographical maps, 
construction land distribution maps, and vital land-
mark distribution maps into its analysis. Unique 
within China, this plan is intended to lead the way 
for other Chinese cities to preserve green space 
and water resources, reduce the greenbelt heat 
island, and stem urban sprawl. The composite map 
of the 16,410 square kilometre municipality depicts 
three categories: ‘land which cannot be developed’ 
(32.2%, primarily a forest reserve in the northeast); 
land subject to ‘controlled construction’ (64.6% 
providing pipeline protection, greenbelt protection, 
earthquake risk management, flood regulation, 
surface water protection, contaminant treatment 
protection), and land ‘suitable for construction’ 
(3.2%, primarily the historic city and the eleven new 
towns surrounding it concentrically).  
 The diagram, while rhetorically and visually 
persuasive, masks three pervasive threats to 
municipal (and by extension, national) governance 
in relation to its urbanisation process.  The first, as 
detailed below, are critiques proffered by planning 
experts on precisely the same grounds that the 
plan is being promoted: namely, its cost to ‘livabil-
ity’, a ‘compact city’, and ‘ecological responsibility’. 
The second is the charge, largely levied against 
the government by the populace, particularly by 
domestic elites, that the plan continues to sacrifice 
cultural heritage and the natural environment to 
short-term political gains and profiteering. The third, 
and perhaps the most vital not only to the stability of 
the city but of the nation, is the rising social unrest 
due to farmland being confiscated by the govern-
ment and the resulting unemployment among the 
former agricultural population. This plan ostensibly 
protects agricultural lands from further unjust devel-
opment, yet it aims to cleanse the first-tier city of 
its undesirable elements, such as disenfranchised 
migrant workers, and paves the way for a two-tiered 
city system to form which, in large part, replaces 
the urban-rural hukou, or ‘household registration’ 
system that previously spatially divided the urban 
and rural populations. The plan thus evokes the 
historical spectre of China’s ‘marauding masses’, 
incited to rebellion by cataclysmic natural disasters 
and disenfranchisement. The ‘spectre’ of ‘peasant 
rebellions’ rampaging the cities manifested prior to 
the 2008 Chinese New Year when power outages 
due to historic blizzards stranded 5.8 million 
migrants at transportation stations, with some 
erupting in violent clashes with authorities. Premier 
Wen Jiabao appeared in person at the Guangzhou 
Railway Station to appease the masses, where one 
angry online commentator summed up the tensions: 
‘What caused 600,000 people to be stranded at the 
train station? It’s not the heavy snow for days, nor is 
it the delayed or cancelled bus service. The problem 
is our old, two-tiered urban-rural divide’.26
 The mapping of controlled construction in Beijing 
Municipality, although presented as scientifically 
rational, displays subtle differences from assump-
tions prevailing in many countries, namely, that it 
is the ‘failure of effective governance within cities 
that explains the poor environmental performance 
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Fig. 2: The Beijing Planning Exhibition Hall opened in 2004 to showcase key features of the Beijing Municipality 2020 
Master Plan to the public. Source: BBC
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of so many cities rather than an inherent charac-
teristic of cities in general’.27 Instead, we encounter 
a rare case where the ‘opposing force fields’ of this 
plan were explicitly identified on one of Shi’s slides 
of the plan, labelled ‘a competition between the 
urban and the ecological environment’. Beijing 2020 
conceives of the city, by definition, as an immanent 
threat to the environment. The anti-urban bias of 
the Maoist regime is well established, and a legacy 
of antagonistic understandings of the city, which 
many officials conceive of as receptacles for capital 
accumulation and potemkinism, lingers in the mind 
of its planners.28  Shi’s presentation of Beijing 2020 
to a U.S. audience emphasised its environmental 
awareness, explicitly avoiding discussion of the 
massive redevelopment of the urban core for the 
2008 Olympics and the construction of eleven new 
towns to house some 5.7 million people relocated 
from the city proper, which aims to limit its popula-
tion to 18 million. The 2007 ratification of the plan 
for the eleven new towns, posted on the municipal 
website, similarly sugar-coats its appeal to a domes-
tic audience, highlighting the symmetry, harmony, 
and beauty of eleven ‘bright pearls’ that ‘ring’ the 
urban core like a ‘jade necklace’.29 Such euphe-
misms immediately evoke traditional symbols of 
good governance and harmonious urban aesthetics, 
glossing over the radical reconfiguration of China’s 
traditionally sustainable, walking-scale milieus and 
lifestyles.
 Again, when presenting the Beijing 2006-2015 
‘Rail Transit Plan’ for Compact City, Shi focused on 
increasing reliance on public transportation rather 
than the fact that these railways connect eleven 
new towns to the city centre. Most planning experts 
on Asian megacities such as Beijing recommend 
against the reinforcement of urban decentralising 
processes through planned satellite developments. 
Rather, planned urban extensions along public 
transport-based axes, such as those in Singapore, 
are considered more successful in limiting urban 
sprawl across the whole metropolitan region.30  As a 
case in point, in 2005 the Beijing Municipal Commis-
sion for Urban Planning (BMCUP), recognising the 
need to fine-tune its 2020 plan to account for vari-
ables such as economic and population growth and 
market forces, commissioned a team of U.S. experts 
to provide an assessment of alternative develop-
ment futures. The scenarios generated by the task 
force predicted that the greatest environmental and 
lifestyle benefits would result from high density and 
contiguous urban development in the existing urban 
area rather than building new satellite towns at the 
far fringe, and from developing sub-regional job-
housing balance along transportation corridors to 
encourage efficient commuting, improve employee 
productivity, and alleviate the current severe traffic 
congestion.31
 University of North Carolina task force member 
Yan Song correctly anticipated, however, that 
BMCUP would not heed recommendations to 
restrict Beijing’s current ‘pancake’ development 
pattern of ring roads. The main reason Beijing 
continues its concentric development, she says, are 
that it is politically risky to raise car or fuel taxes 
or restrict car ownership, as decade-old policies 
encouraging the growth of road construction and 
the automobile industry continue to prioritise the 
car above public transit: ‘This is how local officials 
get promoted to higher ranks; it’s not a conspiracy 
theory; it’s reality’.32 Rather than promoting social 
and ecological sustainability, the residents of 
the new towns, some of which already serve as 
bedroom communities for the lower income popula-
tions, will continue their long commutes into the city 
centre or provide cheap labour for the multinational 
corporations building manufacturing plants in the 
neighbouring areas, while car ownership among the 
elites will rise. Rather than creating a polynucleated 
urban form, as intended, the commuting distances 
and lower quality of life in the new towns will likely 
create two-tiered urban environments, intensifying 
pressure on the urban core. Further, studies indi-
cate that in many ‘megacity’ regions the most likely 
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result of new ‘growth poles’, planned to relieve the 
population pressures on the central city, is sprawl 
on a gigantic scale, resulting from the longer-term 
mobility patterns between and around the new and 
existing centres. The planned depopulation of the 
historic core and the expansion of the outer city to 
absorb migrants from rural areas and the inner city 
radically reconfigures social forms of social and 
spatial organisation that are already sustainable.      
Such calculations do not concern most Chinese  
planners. In the words of Yang Xifeng, Vice Direc-
tor of Lingang New City Administrative Committee 
located in Shanghai Municipality 75 km from the 
city centre, ‘if we build it, they will come’.33 Lingang, 
one of four hundred new Chinese cities planned to 
support populations of 500,000-800,000 by 2020, is 
primarily a capital accumulation fix that serves as an 
industrial basis to support the currently unemployed 
rural population. These cities are nonetheless 
enthusiastically promoted as ‘education cities’, 
‘tourism resorts’, or ‘artist towns’ to attract FDI.  For 
all the rhetoric of education, tourism and culture, 
most urban experts remain sceptical. For example, 
when a group visited Lingang New City prior to 
its ‘official opening’ a Fudan University doctoral 
student exclaimed in disbelief, ‘educated people 
won’t relocate to such a remote area – they’ll run 
right back to Beijing or Shanghai – we don’t work as 
hard as we do only to end up in a cultural backwa-
ter!’  Yang Xifeng conceded that most residents will 
be rural workers employed by the local industries, 
along with resort owners and a smaller number of 
transient young engineers and managers ‘willing to 
sacrifice a few years to contribute to nation-build-
ing’.34   
 The Beijing 2006-2010 ‘Low-Income Housing 
Plan’ for Affordability and Livability conveniently 
enables the municipality to apply sustainability 
rhetoric to its ongoing relocation of residents to the 
new towns and periphery. A distribution map must 
qualify the label it applies to ‘guaranteed housing’ 
by acknowledging it is ‘mixed to a certain degree to 
boost social equity and inclusion’, as this housing is 
located exclusively in the far fringes and new towns. 
Far from embodying the sustainability ideals of social 
justice, this plan reinforces the idea of a second-
class citizenry that will remain disconnected from 
the cultural vitality of the urban core. The urban elite 
will inevitably migrate back into the major cultural 
centres, creating a multi-tiered socio-economic 
regional development directly based upon proximity 
from the core. Given such dynamics, unless draco-
nian restrictions on urban migration are reinstated, 
the unidirectional ‘drift’ of the ‘floating population’ to 
first-tier cities is likely to continue unabated. 
 Finally, the Beijing 2005-2020 ‘Underground 
Space Plan’ for Resource-saving and the Beijing 
2006-2015 ‘Rail Transit Plan’ for a Compact City 
reveal the extent to which the metaphor ‘compact 
city’ can be both literally applied and loosely inter-
preted. Peter Brand is again instructive in his apt 
characterisation of the inherent appeal of the term: 
The compact city is an even more powerful meta-
phor [than the sustainable city], more resonant and 
connected to today’s consumer culture. It is, after 
all, a contemporary of the compact disc – it feeds off 
the latter’s connotations of leading edge technology, 
the latest in lifestyle, and push-button efficiency. 
The compact city puts itself in tacit opposition to the 
tawdriness of sprawl (of cities, or cathode tubes, or 
overweight bodies and ill-focused lives).35
 The Beijing plans for a compact city diagram the 
effects of scarcity and inefficiency. Its correspond-
ing schematic diagrams evoke the provocative 
hyperdensity imagined by the 2005 ‘Beijing Boom 
Towers’ model proposed by the Dutch concern 
Dynamic City Foundation. One of the most aggres-
sive underground space plans in the world, it 
maximises development use rights in the urban 
core by allotting 430 million square metres in the 
shallow layer (up to 10 metres underground) and 
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630 million square meters in the middle layer (10-
30 metres underground), largely clustered around 
traffic hubs and subway transfer stations. In a 
classic case of interests driving planning, these use 
rights are primarily granted to the private developers 
underwriting Beijing’s massive public transportation 
system to serve the new towns. When pressed, 
Mr. Shi allowed that one-third of the construction 
costs of the Number 4 Subway Line, for example, 
is being underwritten by the Hong Kong Metro 
Corporation, which gains land use and operating 
rights from the deal. The municipal investment in 
the underground space plan is further rationalised 
by a chart correlating rising GDP levels to the ability 
to fund sustainable development. This space will 
‘expand the frontiers’ of the city through ‘saving land 
resources, facilitating public transportation, provid-
ing underground parking, expanding storage space, 
reducing pollution, saving energy, protecting open 
space, protecting cultural heritage’. What this rheto-
ric masks is the plan’s compensation for municipal 
development of space-wasting American-style new 
urbanism and planning gated communities on agri-
cultural land in the periphery. Such practices result 
in far less compact urban form than would high 
density and contiguous development in the existing 
urban area.      
Diagnosing Beijing 2008
Prevailing theories of globalisation portray cities as 
spaces of cultural homogenisation where place and 
community are disappearing. Yet cities are charac-
terised not so much by homogeneity as unevenness, 
in places which anchor concrete social, political, 
and spatial projects. Because the dynamics govern-
ing China’s urban transformation are embedded in 
neo-liberal global processes that extend beyond 
local interests or systems, but have been induced 
by the devolution of power to the localities, a series 
of contradictions have ensued. Since the rise of 
neo-liberalism in the 1980s, sustainable develop-
ment worldwide has been undermined by a shift 
in the focus of spatial planning away from regional 
equality to the ‘city in itself’. In 1983 China initi-
ated a structural change in administration to ‘cities 
leading counties’ (shi dai xian) intended to launch 
the economic dismantling of the urban-rural dichot-
omy. By transferring the subordinate counties of 
prefectures to the leadership of cities, ‘the leading 
role of the city was explicitly established to usher 
in an epoch of city-led regional development for the 
first time in Chinese history’.36  
 Yet contradictions in neo-liberal capitalism have 
resulted in competition between cities and the 
second-tier county seats and towns located within 
the huge municipal regions under their jurisdictions. 
With intense global competition for export-oriented 
development, neo-liberal policymakers argue 
against disturbing the market determination of the 
relationship between location and economic activity: 
‘planning should facilitate national economic growth 
and gains in inter-personal equity rather than being 
concerned with misguided attempts to achieve 
convergence of regional incomes and service provi-
sion’.37 Cities, seen as ‘engines of growth’, were to 
add value to rural products, yet the new regionalism 
that emerged as cities and regions prioritised their 
investments according to global trade blocs such as 
ASEAN or NAFTA has driven cities and their regions 
into competition against each other in increasingly 
liberalised markets.  Although the Party continues to 
present Chinese market reforms as gradualism, or 
‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, the notion 
that its current problems are merely transitional side 
effects on the road to an eventual unproblematic 
state of development must be largely discounted.38 
It is possible, and some think probable, that the 
central government will lose control over its decen-
tralised agents who become ‘predatory’ instead of 
developmentalist, creating a crisis of legitimacy for 
the state.39    
 In a persuasive argument against gradualism, 
Daniel Abramson shows that despite the fact that 
current planning practices have not been very 
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cognisant of community and property in their adop-
tion of market-based strategies, these concerns 
have pushed Chinese planning to evolve dialecti-
cally. ‘Each act of conflict-resolution depends on the 
immediate application of a set of existing principles 
– the outcome of which may require a question-
ing of those principles as well as a redefinition of 
the developmental goal’.40 In the process, Abram-
son says, the nature of government itself may be 
redefined, including, for example, the role of politi-
cal parties. In what amounts to a ‘meta-mapping’ of 
China’s city plans, he draws a schematic of changing 
PRC urban planning practices in which he explic-
itly identifies current challenges to governance.
In his diagram, Abramson juxtaposes the regime’s 
‘unintended outcome’ of ‘popular resistance to 
urban expansion and redevelopment’ against the 
‘intended outcome’ of ‘sustainable growth’.  Imma-
nent effects, or what we have described as ‘lines 
of force’, emerge from governmental processes of 
building community, clarifying property rights, and 
protecting the environment through stronger regu-
lation. Abramson predicts that the next generation 
of planning modes to emerge from the synthesis 
of this current dialectic is community enablement, 
incentivisation, and advocacy. By this he means the 
evolution of planning toward the representation of 
public community interests in determining the form 
of cities, where the disposition of property is its ulti-
mate subject. China’s future planning may retain 
its current form of governmental regulations on 
property development or it may develop incentives 
for it; it may continue to promote governmental or 
non-governmental design or it may advocate for it 
by enabling community formation. What Abramson 
imagines in his diagram approaches the immanent 
form of the city-state, where authority grows out of 
the populace.  
 This form of authority is increasingly advocated 
by the cultural elite in China today.  Civic activism 
is on the rise in a wide variety of forums. Socially 
committed filmmakers such as Jia Zhangke raise 
awareness of the human and ecological costs 
of unsustainable development; journalists such 
Wang Jun highlight the consequences of forging 
political symbolisms at the cost of the historical and 
aesthetic integrity of the city, and the avant-garde 
art community stimulates public debate over ethics. 
Huang Rui, co-organiser of the 2006 Dashanzi 
Arts Festival, ‘Beijing and Its Background’ (Beijing 
Beijing), conceived of the theme as a public forum 
for reflecting on the possibility of genuine civic 
culture in Beijing. In a recent interview Huang told 
me: 
Despite the fact that Beijing dates back to the Yuan 
Dynasty, it has always been governed by peas-
ants, from the Mongolians to the Communists, 
who perceived a vibrant civic urban culture as a 
challenge to political authority. These days even 
government leaders realize they need to infuse 
culture back into the city’s cells, given the destruc-
tion of the old urban fabric. But old habits die hard; 
despite their best intentions they habitually destroy 
the very sources of culture that they are now trying 
to nourish. The authorities need to stop thinking like 
peasants and start realizing that both the leadership 
and the populace would benefit from genuine urban 
culture, that it would actually enhance their politi-
cal power. If Beijing cannot succeed in this, other 
Chinese cities are doomed as well.41 
 Huang Rui’s reflections suggest that government 
legitimacy should depend not only on the pursuit of 
policies that strive to realise collective aspirations, 
but also on the ability of the government work to 
reformulate its principles to resolve the contra-
dictions that arise from these aspirations. The 
resistance of Beijing municipal planners to adopt 
sustainability plans which would alter the symmetry 
of Tiananmen Square in the municipality may have 
been culturally determined by the historical primacy 
of the State’s spatial ideology, but a confluence of 
civic forces that may think otherwise is growing. 
Rather than mapping Beijing’s future, a diagram-
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matics of Beijing planning illuminates which form of 
spontaneity preoccupies the nation at this historical 
juncture, disclosing the imminence of ungovern-
able elements in the city. As stated earlier, whether 
something inherent to the city will survive radical 
alterations to its governing polity and urban fabric 
remains an open question. The imminent sociability 
that is the city may govern it after all.
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